Credit Guarantee and Fiscal Costs
研究政府为基础设施部门提供信用担保的效果，发现长期能提高基础设施产出和财政乘数，但短期会挤出私人部门劳动力，且信用扩张导致不良贷款上升。
Abstract This paper studies the effectiveness of government‐backed credit guarantees to the infrastructure sector. We propose a two‐sector model with financial intermediary frictions so that infrastructure producers rely on bank loans to finance production. Governments can intervene in the credit market by providing a partial guarantee. We find that a credit guarantee increases infrastructure production, leading to a high fiscal multiplier in the longer run. In the near term, however, higher infrastructure‐sector wages crowd out private‐sector labor supply. Importantly, the higher leverage associated with credit expansion raises nonperforming loans, and this channel is particularly pronounced if the government‐backed credit guarantees linger.