Managerial Overconfidence and Dividend Stickiness
研究发现过度自信的CEO会在盈利上升时更大幅度增加股利，在盈利下降时更少削减股利，导致向下的股利粘性，且该效应在无迎合动机的企业中更显著。
In this study, we examine whether overconfident CEOs strive to smooth dividends. Our findings show overconfident CEOs increase dividends more as earnings increase and decrease dividends less as earnings decline, resulting in downward dividend stickiness. This asymmetric dividend payout is consistent with the selective self-attribution bias. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on dividend stickiness is more pronounced for firms without catering incentives. In addition, overconfident CEOs do not manage share repurchases as they do for dividends. Therefore, we do not find a positive effect of managerial overconfidence on total payout stickiness.