Endogenous personalized pricing in the Hotelling model
研究了霍特林模型中企业内生选择个性化定价的均衡及其福利影响，发现个性化定价是占优策略，但低效企业无法获益，且可能损害购买高质量产品的消费者。
We study endogenous personalized pricing in Hotelling’s model with vertically differentiated products, cost asymmetries and linear adjustment costs. We characterize the equilibrium and its welfare consequences. Adopting personalized pricing is the dominant strategy for both companies. The less efficient company never gains compared to competition in uniform pricing. We clarify the conditions under which the more efficient company can gain from competition in personalized pricing. Aggregate consumer surplus increases, but personalized pricing can harm consumers who purchase from the more-efficient (high-quality) firm.