A test of (weak) certainty independence
检验了主观不确定性决策模型中确定性独立性和弱确定性独立性公理，发现这些公理与实验中观察到的模糊敏感行为存在根本性冲突，呼吁使用能容纳依赖于获胜几率的模糊态度的模型。
We provide a test of the axioms of certainty and weak certainty independence in models of decision-making under subjective uncertainty. We show that it is through these two weakenings of the classic independence axiom that prominent ambiguity models retain properties that stand in conflict with the ambiguity-sensitive behavior that is revealed in our experiment. Our findings suggest that this conflict may be of a more fundamental nature than what most of these models can accommodate. Our results call for the use of ambiguity models that can accommodate an ambiguity attitude which depends on the chances of winning.