Financial Crises as a Phenomenon of Multiple Equilibria and How to Select among Them
当均衡不唯一时，常用太阳黑子或全局博弈来获得唯一性。本文提出第三种选择机制：最佳反应动态，在银行挤兑等金融危机框架中，它比太阳黑子提供更明确的协调叙事，比全局博弈更符合存款人观察排队长度后决策的现实。
Abstract When equilibrium is indeterminate (i.e., not unique), applied theory often obtains uniqueness either via ad hoc sunspots or via global games. This paper highlights the relative merits of a third selection mechanism—best‐response dynamics (BRD)—in the context of various financial crisis frameworks. For example, in the context of a bank run, selection via BRD is preferred (to ad hoc sunspots) because it provides an explicit coordination narrative and (to global games) because it accounts for the fact that depositors realistically may decide to join or leave a bank's queue upon observing its length.