Credit Markets with Time‐Inconsistent Agents and Strategic Loan Default
研究了生命周期中时间不一致主体在缺乏内部和外部承诺时的信贷合同，发现内生借贷限制可模拟消费者保护规则，政府需借助此类限制才能实现最优配置。
Abstract We study credit contracts under a life‐cycle setting where time‐inconsistent agents lack the internal commitment to stick to consumption plans and external commitment to repaying loans. With unrestricted credit, agents with only internal commitment problems may overborrow. If, additionally, they face external commitment problems, lenders endogenously impose borrowing limits similar to the ability‐to‐repay rules consumer financial protection agencies impose. Even with restricted credit access, except in exceptional cases, agents suffering from the twin commitment problems can achieve, at most, fully sophisticated allocations. The government can achieve the first‐best allocations if and only if it is assisted with endogenously imposed borrowing limits.