Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment
研究了当个人无法对婚前劳动收入分享做出有约束力的承诺时，人力资本和住房投资的扭曲现象，发现性别议价能力差异和婚姻市场失衡会放大这种扭曲。
We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in China), since parents of boys will increase housing investments in order to credibly commit to share more resources with the boy’s potential wife, possibly crowding out human capital investments.