Competition and Bank Payout Policy
利用银行分行层面的存款数据，发现分支机构限制对派息比率有负面影响，且仅对特许权价值低的银行成立，表明风险转移激励驱动了该结果。
Abstract Leveraging branch‐level data on bank deposits, we provide evidence of a negative impact of branching restrictions on payout ratios, which occurs only for banks with a low charter value, as proxied by the market‐to‐book ratio. The results for the market‐to‐book ratio extend to the Lerner index, the return on assets, and the Z‐score, suggesting that risk‐shifting incentives drive our results rather than signaling incentives or agency costs. Our results are robust to different proxies for banking competition and identification strategies, and bootstrap simulations suggest that our results are not due to confounding factors.