A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States
研究了职业许可对工人和消费者的福利影响，发现许可提高了工资和工时但减少了就业，平均福利损失为职业剩余的12%，工人和消费者分别承担70%和30%的负担。
Abstract We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labour market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labour supply but also affects labour demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12% of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70% and 30% of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80% of higher prices for consumers, and higher wages compensate workers for 60% of the cost of mandated investment in occupation-specific human capital. Welfare effects appear more favourable in occupations in which licensing is more common.