Optional Verification and Signaling in Online Matching Markets: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
研究在缺乏声誉机制的在线约会平台上，将电话验证设为可选并公开，发现这种简单验证能作为可信信号，尤其对早期用户或缺乏其他验证手段的用户有效，并促进匹配效率。
Online matching platforms could lack common informational mechanisms, such as ratings and reviews, that serve to reduce information asymmetry in transactional platforms. The lack of verified information about participants further exacerbates issues of information asymmetry in such markets. Our study focuses on a novel role of verification in such matching markets—its ability to serve as a credible signal for a user, when such verification is made optional and visible to other users. In collaboration with a leading online dating platform with no reputation mechanisms and where most of the information is self-disclosed, we design and conduct a randomized field experiment to examine not only who chooses to verify but also, the effectiveness of such optional verification for different types of users. We identify that a simple-to-implement mechanism, such as phone verification, when made optional can take on additional significance in platforms that lack alternate reputation and transaction-assurance mechanisms, especially for those in early years or those that lack other credible mechanisms to verify important information about participants. Our findings also provide insights into how optional verification has heterogeneous impacts on different platform users and can also facilitate desirable matching and benefit the platform as a whole, paving the way for examining other similar verification mechanisms.