Reputation and information aggregation
分析了部分知情决策者的声誉顾虑如何影响她从有声誉顾虑的顾问那里获取信息的能力，发现过高的声誉顾虑会抑制决策者寻求建议的动机，而过低则可能破坏顾问说真话的激励。
We analyze how reputation concerns of a partially informed decision maker affect her ability to extract information from reputation-concerned advisors. Too-high decision maker’s reputation concerns destroy her incentives to seek advice. However, when such concerns are low, she is tempted to solicit advice regardless of her private information, which can undermine advisors’ truth-telling incentives. The optimal strength of the decision maker’s reputation concerns maximizes advice-seeking while preserving advisors’ truth-telling. Prior uncertainty about the state of nature calls for a more reputation-concerned decision maker . Higher expected competence of advisors may worsen information aggregation, unless the decision maker’s reputation concerns are properly adjusted.