Metaverse governance: An empirical analysis of voting within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
研究了元宇宙或共享经济平台中中心化架构的问题，通过分析首个区块链虚拟世界的治理数据，发现开放标准和区块链治理是去中心化的必要条件但不充分，集中投票权可能导致依赖和寻租行为。
In this paper we explore the importance of platform governance. We discuss various problems of centralized architecture in the context of the metaverse or sharing economy applications which may lead to monopoly market structures. We argue that open standards and blockchain-based governance can potentially mitigate some of these issues. We then collect governance data from the first blockchain-based virtual world and conduct an empirical analysis to study voter behavior within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). We provide empirical evidence that open standards and blockchain-based governance are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a decentralized and neutral platform. Centralization and concentrated voting power may lead to dependencies, rent extraction behavior and create hold-up problems. Consequently, producers, prosumers and service providers must evaluate the governance structure of the platform before establishing a presence.