Share buybacks and corporate tax cuts
研究发现自1980年代中期以来，美国企业减税对经济的扩张作用减弱，且与股票回购增加相关。模型表明限制回购能增强减税效果，但大部分收益归股东，非股东能否受益取决于融资方式。
Since the mid-1980s, U.S. corporate tax cuts have become less expansionary and increasingly associated with rising share buybacks. Using dynamic general equilibrium models with endogenous financial allocations towards corporate investment and buybacks, we show that buybacks render corporate tax cuts less expansionary. Simulations based on the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act have optimal buyback responses much smaller than those observed. This implies that restricting buybacks enhances corporate tax cut effects. Most of the income increases from corporate tax cuts accrue to shareholders. Whether non-shareholders enjoy higher consumption depends on the financing mechanism.