Secret and Overt Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
研究了信息获取活动的可观察性如何通过定价效应和竞争效应影响投资者行为，并应用于企业实地考察的自愿与强制披露分析。
Abstract We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.