Credit Access, Selection, and Incentives in a Market for Asset-Collateralized Loans: Evidence From Kenya
研究了肯尼亚农村地区提高耐用农业资产抵押比例对贷款获取和还款行为的影响，发现抵押比例从0%提高到96%显著增加了贷款需求，但对还款和盈利影响很小，且未发现道德风险。
Abstract We study the potential for asset collateralization to expand access to credit in rural Kenya. Increasing the share of a loan for a durable agricultural asset that is collateralized by the physical asset itself (from 0 to 96%) while reducing the share backed by financial assets increases loan take-up considerably, with only a very limited impact on repayment behavior and the lender's profitability. A Karlan–Zinman test finds evidence of small and marginally significant selection effects in some specifications but no evidence of moral hazard. We find no evidence that joint versus individual liability affects take-up or repayment. Loans had real impacts on investment, milk sales, and girls’ school enrollment. The lender, a savings and credit cooperative, responded to the study results by offering 80% asset-collateralized loans.