The highs and the lows: bank failures in Sweden through inflation and deflation, 1914–1926
本文利用生存分析研究1914-1926年瑞典银行危机，发现通缩期间短期贷款和负债的期限结构是银行倒闭的主因，而繁荣期杠杆、弱抵押贷款和外国借款的增长也与失败相关。
Abstract This paper revisits the Swedish banking crisis (1919–1926) that materialized as post-war deflation replaced wartime inflation (1914–1918). Inspired by Fisher’s “debt deflation theory,” we employ survival analysis to “predict” which banks would fail, given certain ex-ante bank characteristics. Our tests support the theory; maturity structures mattered most in a regime of falling prices, with vulnerable shorter-term customer loans and bank liabilities representing the most consistent cause of bank distress in the crisis. Similarly, stronger growth in (1) leverage, (2) weaker collateral loans, and (3) foreign borrowing during the boom were all associated with bank failure.