Do pension buyouts help or hurt employees (retirees)?
通过随机模型比较养老金买断前后员工和退休人员的预期养老金违约损失，发现州担保协会保护水平低于联邦养老金担保公司是导致退休人员福利下降的关键因素，而员工福利变化取决于雇主违约风险和养老金资金状况。
Abstract This article compares expected pension default losses of employees and retirees before and after pension buyouts. The comparisons are made using a stochastic model calibrated with market data. The analysis shows that the lower protection level provided by the State Guarantee Association relative to that of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a critical factor that explains the welfare reduction, or equivalently, larger expected pension default losses, of most retirees who become annuity holders in the buyouts. The analysis also shows that the employee welfare, or equivalently expected pension default gains or losses, depends on the continued PBGC protection and, critically, their employers' postbuyout default risk and pension funding status. Moreover, these employee welfare changes are quite different for the corporations included in this analysis. Our results suggest that welfare improvements depend on the PBGC and state insurance regulators' cooperation in protecting pension participants and supervising buyout insurers.