Myopic fiscal objectives and long-Run monetary efficiency
研究短视的财政当局（只关心当期分配和支出）是否损害长期货币效率。在代际交叠模型中，短视财政政策反而通过支持货币交易实现有效均衡，但财政能力受限时会导致多重均衡和次优结果。
Is the pursuit of myopic fiscal objectives, such as short-run redistribution or public spending, a threat to long-run monetary efficiency? We answer this question in the context of a textbook overlapping generations model where we introduce a sequence of one-period fiscal authorities that can tax endowments and trade money. Each authority is myopic in that it cares only about current agents' utility and its own consumption, without any concern about the future. Nonetheless, we show that the sequence of fiscally-backed money purchases that maximize the current authority's objective also selects a unique equilibrium – one in which money is traded at the efficient intertemporal price – as a by-product. In fact, myopic redistribution policies ensure equality in marginal utilities making up for incomplete markets, without interfering with the efficiency of private intertemporal choices. Multiplicity and sub-optimality emerge as fiscal capacity is bounded, inducing authorities to use money trades to generate resources for public consumption.