Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations
研究了标准制定组织中创新者与实施者的参与动机，分析了实施者友好型知识产权政策对行业利润和福利的倒U型影响，有助于理解为何许多成员企业规模较小。
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are collectively self-governed industry associations, formed by innovators and implementers. They are a key organizational form to agree on and manage technical standards, and form the foundation for many technological and economic sectors. We develop a model of endogeneous SSO participation that highlights different incentives for joining (namely licensing, learning, and implementation). We analyze equilibrium selection and conduct comparative statics for a policy parameter that is related to implementer-friendly Intellectual Property Rights policies, or alternatively, minimum viable implementation. The results can reconcile existing evidence, including that many SSO member firms are small. The extent of statutory participation of implementers in SSO control has an inverted U-shape effect on industry profits and welfare.