Does IRS Monitoring Matter for the Cost of Bank Loans?
研究发现国税局监管力度越大，企业获得银团贷款的利率越低，因为监管增强了借款人的议价能力，抑制了银行利用信息优势获取超额收益。
Abstract We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.