Financial Covenants and Fire Sales in Closed-End Funds
研究了封闭式基金中的契约条款如何导致资产抛售风险，发现抵押贷款凭证基金在契约约束下会低价抛售不良贷款，从而产生类似开放式基金的价格压力。
Closed-end funds are thought to have negligible fire sale risk as they have stable funding. However, I show that embedded covenants can generate price pressure in collateralized loan obligation (CLO) funds, even though such funds are closed end. Loans held by constrained CLOs report significantly lower cumulative returns than loans held by unconstrained CLOs. This can be explained by contractual arbitrage, a practice by which CLOs exploit loopholes in the design of covenants to mechanically loosen their covenants and avoid covenant breaches. Covenant breaches are associated with significant pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs, affecting CLO compensation, reputation, and career prospects. I show that when covenants breaches are imminent, managers fire sell distressed loans. Hence, I demonstrate a channel by which closed-end funds can also create fire sale risk, akin to their open-end counterparts. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Funding: This research was funded by the John and Serena Liew Fellowship Fund at the Fama-Miller Center for Research in Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, the University of Chicago PhD Program Office, the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and State, and the University of Chicago Library. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4708 .