Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition
研究了委员会成员在信息获取、讨论和投票中，对内部声誉（基于讨论）和外部声誉（基于群体决策）的关注如何影响其努力水平，发现内部声誉在大型委员会中激励更强。
We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members’ internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members’ external reputations are based on the observed group decision. We find that either form of reputation concerns creates strategic complementarity among members’ effort levels. Internal reputations create stronger incentives to become informed than external reputations. Their strength grows in committee size; external reputations create no incentives in large committees. Finally, reputation concerns may relax participation constraints.