The politics of police accountability: Police expulsions in Buenos Aires, Argentina
研究阿根廷布宜诺斯艾利斯省警察问责机构的运作，发现改革派部长在任职第一年开除警察最多，而中期选举胜利或丑闻等因素并无显著影响，揭示了发展中国家警察控制的政治激励与障碍。
Abstract Police accountability has long been deemed an essential component of democratizing reform. Reformist administrations in Latin America and other developing regions have consequently created oversight agencies to monitor police misconduct. However, the literature has not yet explored how these institutions operate and the politics that undergird them. This paper examines how police accountability institutions work in developing democracies. I focus on the police of the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, using an untapped database of more than 6400 expelled police officers. I find that the extent to which reformist ministers expel police officers and thus exercise greater control of the police peaks during their first year in office. Contrarily, it is not bolstered by mid‐term electoral victories or factors such as scandals or violent crimes. The paper extends our knowledge of the politics of police accountability in developing democracies, outlining the incentives and obstacles for politicians to control the police.