Mechanism design with informational punishment
研究在机制与外部现状机制竞争时，引入信息惩罚（延迟发送可篡改的公开信息且他人无法承诺忽略）来确保完全参与无损，并证明其与标准显示原理兼容、独立于设计者目标且仅离线操作。
We introduce informational punishment to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.