Lending Relationships and the Pricing of Syndicated Loans
研究了银行与借款人的关系如何影响银团贷款的定价调整和发行效率，发现强关系能减少定价调整、缩短发行时间并降低折价，对金融从业者和学者有参考价值。
Using a dataset on syndicated loan primary market pricing adjustments, we examine whether relationship banks’ information advantage facilitates price discovery in loan issuances. We find that the lead bank makes fewer adjustments to the initial pricing terms of a syndicated loan and shortens the syndication time when it has a stronger relationship with the borrower. A stronger relationship also reduces loan underpricing. A relationship lead bank relies less on information from syndicate members. Exogenous shocks to relationships caused by bank mergers and closures confirm our findings. We contribute to the literature by showing that relationship lending improves loan pricing efficiency. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4730 .