Bringing Them In or Pushing Them Out? The Labor Market Effects of Pro-Cyclical Unemployment Assistance Changes
利用西班牙2012年提高无限期失业援助最低年龄的改革，研究发现缩短福利期限减少了失业时长但降低了再就业工资，并导致年长工人退出劳动力市场或转向其他项目。
Abstract We exploit an unanticipated labor market reform to estimate the effects of procyclical changes in long-term unemployment assistance (UA). In July 2012, Spain raised the minimum age to receive unlimited-duration UA from 52 to 55. Using a difference-in-differences design, we document that shorter benefits caused (1) shorter unemployment duration, especially among younger workers; (2) higher labor force exit and other programs’ take-up, especially among older workers; and (c) lower wages upon reemployment. The reform induced moderate government savings. Our results highlight the importance of considering the interplay with labor market conditions when designing long-term benefit schedules that affect workers close to retirement.