Informed Information Design
研究了知情设计者在无事先承诺能力下，通过选择披露机制影响代理人行动的问题，刻画了使每种设计者类型获得高于可信信念披露机制收益的贝叶斯相关均衡子集，并证明该子集非空且可处理。
We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents’ actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante–optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.