Optimal Dynamic Mediation
研究调解人如何与讨价还价者沟通，在消耗战模型中刻画了最大化灵活类型收益的唯一调解均衡，发现调解人立即获取私人信息但延迟提出协议，仅在承诺概率低于代理人偏好协议中的收益份额时才能改善无调解结果。
How should mediators communicate with bargainers? When can they improve outcomes? Can arbitrators that impose outcomes do better? I provide answers in wars of attrition with flexible and commitment types, consistent with reputational bargaining. I characterize the unique mediated equilibrium, which maximizes flexible types’ payoffs. The mediator immediately elicits private information but waits to suggest agreements. She front-loads agreements between flexible types, while initially delaying any involving commitment types. This improves on unmediated outcomes only if commitment probabilities are less than agents’ payoff share in their preferred agreement. Arbitrators do strictly better but sometimes impose disagreement, which may be hard to enforce.