Votes for excluded minorities and the voting behavior of the existing majority: A laboratory experiment
通过实验室实验，研究将投票权扩展到被排斥的少数群体，以及让现有多数群体代理投票对选举结果的影响，发现多数群体会因规则变化而改变投票以保护自身利益，导致改革效果不及预期。
When voting rights are extended, people pay attention to the behavior of new voters. However, the reactions of existing voters are also crucial for voting outcomes after enfranchisement. This study conducts a laboratory experiment to compare the effects of extending voting rights to minorities who did not initially have the right to vote and granting proxy votes to the existing majority who vote on behalf of the minorities. We observe that enfranchising excluded minorities increases the proportion of votes in favor of minorities. However, the realized proportion is not as large as expected. Proxy voting does not increase this proportion. Behind such aggregate outcomes, some existing majorities alter their vote choices to protect their payoffs in response to changes in voting rules. Electoral reforms that do not consider such a response but rely on the altruism of the existing majority are unlikely to succeed in reflecting minorities’ interests.