Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis
研究了一种针对多样化商品的内生参考价格拍卖机制，实验表明该机制能减少价值误差，提高卖方利润、配置效率和总剩余，对大型拍卖实践有重要启示。
, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using "reference prices." Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.