Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*
研究了消费者对产品不完全了解时，企业同时或分阶段竞争价格与质量的博弈模型，发现有限意识下两种博弈均衡接近标准单阶段模型，简化了分析。
When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one‐stage or a two‐stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one‐stage and the two‐stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one‐stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one‐stage game is analyzed.