Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence
研究了全球上市公司将ESG指标纳入高管薪酬合同的做法，发现该做法与国家、行业和公司特征相关，并与机构投资者参与有关，能改善ESG表现但不提升财务绩效。
ABSTRACT Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm levels in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagement, voting, and trading by institutional investors, which suggests that firms could be adopting this practice to align their management's objectives with the preferences of certain shareholder groups. Finally, we find that the adoption of ESG Pay is accompanied by improvements in key ESG outcomes, but not by improvements in financial performance.