Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by Credit Default Swap Investors
研究了信用违约互换（CDS）买卖双方干预困境企业重组如何影响企业价值，发现买方干预解决承诺问题但增加无效清算风险，卖方干预减少过度清算，两者结合可分离承诺与清算问题，甚至解决空头债权人问题，实现最优企业价值。
There have been several cases in recent years where credit default swap (CDS) buyers and sellers intervene in the restructuring of a distressed firm. We show theoretically that this can increase firm value. Intervention by CDS buyers solves the commitment problem between equity and debt holders but increases the probability of inefficient liquidation. Intervention by CDS sellers reduces the issue of excessive liquidation while keeping the benefits of CDS buyer intervention. Having both types of intervention decouples the commitment problem from the liquidation problem. Under certain assumptions, the so-called empty creditor problem can be solved, and firm value reaches first best. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4717 .