Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market
研究了金融系统集中风险如何改变机构的风险承担激励，发现银行间市场使风险机构变得庞大且相互关联，导致过度风险承担，而限制互联性的宏观审慎监管能提升福利。
The concentration of risk within the financial system leads to systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk-taking incentives of financial institutions when the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing interbank claims, risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This concentrated structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crises in a privately optimal way but leads to excessive risk taking even by peripheral institutions. Interconnectedness and excessive risk taking reinforce one another. Macroprudential regulation that limits the interconnectedness of risky institutions improves welfare.