State-Dependent Attention and Pricing Decisions
研究了在理性疏忽下，价格制定者如何通过动态和灵活的信息获取来追踪未知目标，模型将不完全信息作为价格刚性的唯一来源，同时解释了微观证据中的典型事实和状态依赖注意力的实证结果。
This paper studies price-setting decisions under rational inattention. Prices are set by tracking an unobserved target whose distribution is also unknown. Information acquisition is dynamic and fully flexible since, given information acquired previously, price setters choose the amount of information they collect as well as how they want to learn about both the outcome and its distribution. We show that by allowing for imperfect information to be the unique source of rigidity, the model can reconcile stylized facts in the microeconomic evidence on price setting while simultaneously being consistent with empirical results on state-dependent attention.