Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*
研究了平台价格平价条款对消费者混淆的影响，发现该条款可能增加或减少混淆、价格和消费者剩余，且只有当损害消费者时才会在均衡中出现。
Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.