Vertical Contract Disclosure in Three‐Tier Industries*
研究三级产业中上游垄断者向制造商供应产品、制造商通过两个零售商销售时，公开账簿政策（披露投入价格）对行业利润和消费者剩余的影响。
Consider a three‐tier industry with a monopolist supplying a manufacturer which sells its product to final consumers through two retailers. Contracts are linear and secret. Hence, upon receiving an out‐of‐equilibrium offer, each retailer must form a belief about the identity of the deviating upstream firm. This beliefs' specification problem wipes out if an Open Book Accounting (OBA) policy is implemented, whereby the input price is disclosed to retailers. Under Cournot (Bertrand) competition, OBA increases industry profits and consumer surplus if retailers believe that any out‐of‐equilibrium offer is more likely to reflect a deviation by the upstream supplier (by the manufacturer).