Dual holding and bank risk
研究发现，同时持有银行股权和债券的投资者（双重持有者）能降低银行风险并提升业绩，尤其在信息不透明的银行中效果更明显，这有助于减少银行过度冒险行为，对金融系统稳定有重要启示。
Abstract Using the 2007–2009 financial crisis as a quasi‐natural experiment, we show that banks with investors holding simultaneously both equity and bonds (dual‐holders) exhibit lower risk and superior performance. Dual‐holders' influence is higher in more opaque banks, indicating that the mechanism of transmission is through a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in debtholder–shareholder conflict. This effect translates into higher unconditional and risk‐adjusted stock returns. These economically large results show that a market mechanism implemented by outside investors is strongly effective in mitigating excessive risk taking by banks thus providing important normative implications for the stability of financial systems.