Transnational crimes: how nations should cooperate and why they don't*
研究跨国犯罪执法中的合作困境，发现国家因担心承担执法负担而不愿共享情报，且仅协调刑事制裁效果有限，犯罪威慑冲击会先被来源国吸收。
Abstract Chain‐form crime partnerships and intelligence sharing by national authorities to detect cross‐border partners create multiple externalities in the combat against transnational crimes and illicit trafficking. Cooperative enforcements that minimize global harms prioritize the country with lower intelligence production and/or superior detection capability. In equilibrium, as in practice, national enforcements are underbudgeted and might prioritize the wrong side – predominantly the high‐budget, high‐harm country. Governments might not share intelligence out of fear of importing enforcement burden, and harmonizing criminal sanctions alone might not be effective. Shocks on crime deterrence in a target country are first absorbed by source countries, implying weaker horizontal crime transfer effects than projected.