Partial centralization in a durable‐good supply chain
研究了耐用品制造商部分拥有下游零售商的部分集中化供应链结构，发现适当的所有权比例能改善产品销售模式并缓解耐用品的时间不一致问题，且制造商最优所有权随产品耐用性和决策期长度递减。
There has been extensive research on the strategic choice between supply chain centralization and decentralization. However, most research assumes complete centralization or complete decentralization but omits the commonly adopted supply chain structure of partial centralization. With partial centralization, a firm owns a portion, but not all, of its partner. To help fill this research gap, in this paper, we make a major contribution by explicitly analyzing partial centralization in a supply chain where a durable‐good manufacturer owns a portion of its downstream retailer. We start with a two‐period model and derive analytical equilibrium outcomes of the supply chain and its members under complete centralization, complete decentralization, and partial centralization. First, our analysis reveals that partial centralization with an appropriate portion of ownership can yield the desirable product sales pattern over periods and alleviate the time‐inconsistency problem in selling durable goods. As a result, partial centralization can become the equilibrium structure for a durable‐good supply chain. Second, the manufacturer's optimal ownership level in the retailer decreases in the product durability and decision horizon length, implying that complete decentralization is more likely to be the supply chain structure in equilibrium for higher product durability and longer decision horizon. Third, our extended analyses demonstrate the robustness of the main results with backward partial centralization. Moreover, partial centralization outperforms conventional strategies such as two‐part tariffs that can coordinate a supply chain but not fully solve the time‐inconsistency problem associated with durable goods.