Lending Next to the Courthouse: Exposure to Adverse Events and Mortgage Lending Decisions
研究美国抵押贷款市场，发现贷款官员接触法拍新闻越多，贷款拒绝率对法拍强度越敏感，且受影响分支发放的贷款违约率更低，表明信贷标准提高，导致市场下行时信贷供给收紧。
Abstract Adverse market events can affect credit supply not only by hurting financial fundamentals but also by changing the risk-taking behaviors of individual decision-makers. We provide micro-level evidence of this individual decision-making channel in the U.S. mortgage market. We find that mortgage application rejection rates are more sensitive to foreclosure intensity when loan officers are more exposed to foreclosure news, despite the same housing market and bank fundamentals. Loans originated from the affected branches have lower ex post default rates, consistent with higher lending standards being applied. In the aggregate, this effect results in tighter credit supply during housing market downturns.