Government funding incentives and study program capacities in public universities: theory and evidence
基于挪威数据，研究发现绩效资助在机构容量限制或学生竞争时能有效调整学习名额，但长期影响有限，解释了为何文献中绩效资助效果甚微。
Abstract Objectives aimed at increasing higher education productivity, for instance, measured by credits per student, have stimulated the use of performance-based funding (PBF) by higher education institutions (HEIs). On theoretical grounds, PBF is expected to speed-up study program capacity adjustments through (re)allocations of study places. We conclude from analyses of Norwegian data that study places are adjusted efficiently if there are binding capacity restrictions at the institution level, or competition for students. Strengthened PBF does not affect long-run adjustments. Instead, admissions seem to adjust to secure full enrollment. The results provide an explanation of why very few positive effects of PBF in higher education are found in the literature. Given continued use of PBF to enhance productivity, a likely policy implication is to impose tighter restrictions on the total number of study places allocated to HEIs, or to change the price structure of the PBF model.