Creditor-Control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
研究发现国家层面债权人权利越强，企业信用违约互换（CDS）的非同步性越低，尤其在债权人-股东冲突严重时，且破产改革加强债权人权利后CDS非同步性下降，表明债务人策略性披露动机占主导。
Abstract We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.