Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
提出可合并加权多数博弈概念，首次刻画Colomer-Martínez权力指数，定义并刻画结合公共品与Colomer-Martínez思想的新权力指数，并分析厄瓜多尔国民议会。
Abstract In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.