Remote Board Meetings and Board Monitoring Effectiveness: Evidence from China
利用中国数据，研究同步远程董事会会议是否通过降低董事的从众压力来提升监督效果，发现远程会议改善了董事参会行为、增加了异议、提高了CEO强制更替对业绩的敏感度，并促进了更有效的投资。
Abstract Using Chinese data, we examine whether synchronous remote board meetings, which facilitate status equalization among directors and alleviate their pressure for conformity, affect board monitoring effectiveness. We find that compared to face-to-face meetings, synchronous remote meetings are associated with directors’ better meeting attendance behavior, a higher likelihood of director dissent on monitoring-related proposals, higher forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and more effective investments. These results hold when we use remote meetings that include both synchronous and asynchronous remote meetings. Proposal-director level analysis further shows that remote meetings reduce the pressure to conform faced by young first-term directors and socially connected directors. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.