Impact of Regulations on Firm Value: Evidence from the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
利用2016年美国总统选举结果作为监管预期变化的冲击，研究发现受监管较多的企业在选举后10个交易日内累计异常股票回报率比受监管较少的企业高出约4%，且这种效应与高增长企业受损、在位企业通过降低竞争和政治偏袒获取租金有关。
Abstract Using the 2016 U.S. presidential election result as a shock to the expectations about the future regulatory environment, I find that most regulated firms earned approximately 4% higher cumulative abnormal stock returns than least regulated firms during the first 10 trading days after the election. Exploring economic mechanisms, I find evidence consistent with the explanation that more regulations disproportionately harm high-growth firms and allow incumbent firms to extract rents through lower competition and political favoritism. Stock returns are also followed by a shift in firm fundamentals over 3 years after 2016, consistent with the economic mechanisms.