Family Firms’ Acquisitions and Politicians as Directors: A Socioemotional Wealth Approach
基于社会情感财富理论，研究西班牙上市公司数据发现，家族企业比非家族企业更不愿进行收购，且当董事会中没有前政客时这种倾向更明显；前政客对收购的促进作用仅存在于低动态行业。
This study analyzes how family control influences firms’ acquisition activity using a socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach and discusses their anticipated SEW gains and losses when making acquisition decisions. Data collected from Spanish public companies from 2010 to 2015 indicates that family firms are more reticent about undertaking acquisitions than nonfamily firms, and their lower propensity is more pronounced when there are no former politicians on the board of directors whose presence could reduce potential SEW losses. Furthermore, the benefits of former politicians on the board of family firms in terms of acquisition activity only occur in low-velocity industries.