Choice with Affirmative Action
研究在有限资源分配中如何平衡优先顺序与少数群体支持，提出单调性和可替代性公理，刻画了有界储备表示和词典序平权行动规则。
A choice rule with affirmative action decides on the recipients of a limited number of identical objects by reconciling two objectives: respecting a priority ordering over the applicants and supporting a minority group. We extend the standard formulation of a choice problem by incorporating a type function and a priority ordering and introduce monotonicity axioms on how a choice rule should respond to variations in these parameters. We show that monotonic and substitutable affirmative action rules are the ones that admit a bounded reserve representation. As a prominent class of choice rules that satisfy the monotonicity axioms, we characterize lexicographic affirmative action rules that are prevalent both in the literature and in practice. Our axiomatic approach provides a novel way to think about reserve systems and uncovers choice rules that go beyond lexicographic affirmative action rules. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: B. Doğan gratefully acknowledges financial support from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust [Grant SRG1819\190133].