OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS
研究了卖方在信息不完全时如何动态选择贸易信贷合同，发现支付合同可筛选买方类型，且长期来看所有支付条款的转换都会导致卖方提供贸易信贷。
Abstract In buyer–seller relationships, offering trade credit to buyers fosters long‐term collaboration but seller provision varies systematically as relationships evolve. We study the optimal provision dynamics of trade credit when the seller's information about the buyer is incomplete. We show how the interaction of self‐enforcing relational contracts and formal contracts determines optimal payment contract choice. We find that payment contracts can be interpreted as screening technologies and imply distinct learning opportunities about the buyer's type. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that all transitions between payment terms lead to seller trade credit provision in the long run.