Financing Competitors: Shadow Banks’ Funding and Mortgage Market Competition
研究发现，影子银行的资金来自其抵押贷款竞争对手银行，银行利用上游资金市场势力削弱下游竞争，最终伤害最需要影子银行服务的消费者。
Abstract Using novel shadow bank funding data, I find that shadow banks are funded by the very banks they compete with when originating mortgages. Evidence suggests that banks have market power in the upstream market for shadow banks’ funding, which in turn softens mortgage market competition through their strategic behaviors in both markets. I build and calibrate a quantitative model of vertical integration and competition to show that those consumers who would most benefit from shadow bank services are the ones to bear the costs. Secondary market innovation could increase downstream competition by reducing shadow banks’ reliance on their competitors. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.